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Background: The growth of the private health insurance sector in Western countries, which is characterized by
information deficiencies and limited competition, necessitates the implementation of effective regulatory tools. One
measure which is widely used is the medical loss ratio (MLR). Our objective was to analyze how MLR is applied as a
regulatory measure in the Israeli voluntary health insurance (VHI) market in order to promote the protection of
beneficiaries. The study will examine MLR values and the use of this tool by regulators of VHI in Israel.
Methods: Descriptive analysis using 2005–2012 data from public reports of the Ministry of Health and the Ministry
of Finance on VHI plans in three market segments: nonprofit health plans, group (collective) policies offered by
commercial insurance companies and individual policies offered by commercial insurance companies.
Results: In 2012, 74% of the Israeli population owned VHI provided by nonprofit health plans and 43% owned VHI
offered by for-profit commercial companies. At that time the MLRs of three nonprofit health plans were significantly
lower than 80%, mostly in the upper layers of coverage. The MLR in the individual commercial segment was consistently
low (38% in 2012). The use of MLR as a regulation tool was, and continues to be, relatively limited in all segments.
Conclusion: The VHI in Israel covers several essential services that are not covered by the statutory benefits package as a
result of budget constraints. Thus, due to the high penetration rate of VHI in Israel compared to European countries and
the lower levels of MLR, in order to assure the protection of beneficiaries it may be warranted to increase the extent of
regulation and adjust it to the nature of the services covered. This may include distinguishing between essential and
nonessential coverages and implementation of the most suitable regulatory measures (such as an MLR threshold,
limitation of services covered and adjusting the actuarial models to the beneficiaries’ behavior), rather than focusing only
on assuring solvency.
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Following the enactment of the National Health Insurance
Law (1995). In Israel, all permanent residents have univer-
sal coverage providing access to a broad benefits package,
including physician consultations, hospitalization, medica-
tion and ambulatory care. Health services that are not in-
cluded in this coverage are financed via voluntary health
insurance (VHI) and direct out-of-pocket payments. There
are two forms of VHI in Israel. The first is VHI provided
by all four health plansa (Clalit Health Services [henceforth
Clalit]; Maccabi Healthcare Services [henceforth Maccabi];* Correspondence: simont@bgu.ac.il
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unless otherwise stated.Meuhedet and Leumit). The second form is commercial
VHI, provided by commercial insurance companies [1].
There is widespread consensus that VHI eases the pres-
sure on the public budget, enables free choice of health in-
surance and improves efficiency [2], yet most also believe
that this market should be regulated in order to assure
consumer protection.
The World Health Report [3] encouraged health sys-
tems worldwide to be responsive to people’s expectations
and preferences. Pursuing this recommendations in the
context of VHI means exploration of whether health in-
surance attributes (i.e. payment modalities, healthcare
provider network and management structures) satisfy
consumers’ expectations and preferences enough to
make it a worthwhile purchase and preferable to otherntral. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public Domain
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under conditions of perfect competition would inherently
strive to satisfy consumers’ preferences; thus, only minimal
regulation would be required. However, due to several
market failures such as information deficiencies, moral
hazard, adverse selection and higher market concentration,
more substantial market regulation is warranted.
The medical loss ratio (MLR) is a widely used indica-
tor that is defined as the ratio of total losses incurred
(paid and reserved) in medical claims plus adjustment
expenses divided by the total premiums earned [4]. Al-
though this measure is calculated differently across
countries as well as across different health insurance
plans within the same country, generally high ratios can
be achieved either through high medical expenditures
(numerator) and/or low premiums (denominator). This
measure is interpreted by purchasers, insurers and regu-
lators in different manners. In his illuminative article,
Robinson [5] has argued that MLR may not be interpreted
as a measure of clinical quality or social contribution. He
pointed out four potential sources of differences in MLRs:
the nature of the vertical structure of the health system,
the product diversification, the channel diversification and
the geographic scope [5]. Namely, higher MLRs may be
observed among HMOs where the insurer and the pro-
viders are vertically integrated, since they may attribute
less administrative expenses to the insurance plan. In
addition, higher values of MLRs may be observed in large
health plans or those targeted at large group of employers
due to economies of scale and lower marketing costs.
Regulatory approaches to VHI markets vary across
countries and on the level of intensity spectrum. At its
one end lies a regulatory system that is focused mainly
on financial aspects such as enforcement of solvency
standards, thus reflecting limited governmental involve-
ment in the market. At the other end of the spectrum
lies tighter regulation (material regulation) that adopts
stricter requirements to assure consumer protection
such as high accessibility to qualitative coverage. The
Third Directive of the European Union on Non-Life In-
surance in Europe (1994) was adopted by the member
states regarding private health insurance markets pro-
vided by both commercial and non-commercial insurers.
Generally, when addressing health insurance policies
that are not substitutive, i.e. do not cover the same bene-
fits as those provided by the statutory health insurance
coverage, this directive focuses mainly on financial regu-
latory tools to promote both the financial stability of in-
surers and consumer protection. However, when private
health insurance is substitutive to the statutory one,
tighter regulatory approaches (material regulation) are
allowed by the Directive [6]. An example for material
regulation can be observed in the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act Public Law (2010) in the UnitedStates, which enforces large‐group health insurance
plans (101 employees or more) to keep minimum MLR
of 85% of the premium revenue and small‐group (up to
100 employees) health insurance plans to keep a mini-
mum MLR of 80% [7].
In recent years, policy makers in Israel have raised
concerns regarding the negative influence of the increase
of private health insurance on the publicly financed
health sector (e.g. unequal competition on human re-
sources, inefficient duplicity of services, etc.) and recom-
mended that tighter regulation requirements be applied
[8-10]. The Israeli setting can provide laboratory condi-
tions to examine the intensity of regulation on the VHI
market since it is not subject to exogenous limitations.
On the one hand, similarly to most of the European
countries, Israel has universal statutory health insurance
with relatively generous coverage. In general, its VHI is
not a duplication of the statutory coverage or substitu-
tive to it, and its main components are supplementary
and complementary to the basic coverage. In addition,
similarly to Europe, VHI in Israel is offered both by non-
profit mutualities and by for-profit commercial insures.
However, as opposed to the European VHI market, Is-
rael’s regulatory authorities are not obligated to the
Third Directive on Non-Life Insurance and thus free to
determine the nature and extent of applied regulatory
measures, namely, the optimal mix of financial and ma-
terial regulations. Given the above mentioned calls for
more intensive regulation of the VHI market in Israel,
one would expect that material regulation will be in-
creased. In this article we examine the intensity of the
regulation through one potential regulatory tool – MLR –
that combines aspects of consumer protection, including
accessibility to quality care, and insurers’ solvency. The
purpose of this study is to analyze how MLR is regulated
in our unique environment in order to improve the pro-
tection of beneficiaries. Specifically, the purpose is to
examine MLR values and the degree of its regulation in
three market segments of VHI in Israel: the nonprofit
health plans, the group (collective) commercial health in-
surance market and the market of individual commercial
health insurance policies. We used 2005–2012 data from
public reports of the Ministry of Health and the Ministry
of Finance.
VHI in Israel
Our data refer to VHI for medical expenses (excluding
long-term care, compensation for critical illnesses, dis-
abilities, and insurance of non-residents of Israel and for
Israelis traveling abroadb) of three insurance arrange-
ments: VHI provided by health plans; group (collective)
commercial VHI; and individual policies of commercial
VHI. Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of these
three segments. The VHI provided by the health plans in
Table 1 Characteristics of the voluntary health insurance market in Israel
Market segment Health plans Group commercial Individual commercial
Legal framework National Health Insurance Law
(1994)
Insurance Contract Law (1981) Insurance
Business (Control) Law (1981)
Insurance Contract Law (1981) Insurance
Business (Control) Law (1981)
Regulatory Authority Ministry of Health Ministry of Finance Ministry of Finance
Medical underwriting is legally
possible
No Yes Yes
Eligibility Health plans’ enrollees Organization (group) members Whole population




(both premium and coverage)
Short-term, periodically modifiable
(both premium and coverage)
Guaranteed lifetime contract,
relatively non-modifiable
Tax status Nonprofit For-profit For-profit
Number of firm 4 6 10
CR3† 95%* 95%** 69%**
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index# 0.35* 0.40** 0.21**
Channel diversification Single contract to a large group Single contract to a large group Different contract to each
individual
Vertical structure Partial ownership of most of
providers
Contractual linkage with providers Contractual linkage with providers
†The index measures the fraction of market income (paid premiums) that is attributed to the three largest firms.
#The index is calculated as the sum of squared share of all firms operating in the market. The share refers to the ratio of firm’s premiums income in the total
income in the market.
*Computed by the authors following data from 2013 public report of the Ministry of Health [11].
**Source: 2013 public report of the Ministry of Finance [12].
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to the commercial VHI, and while the health plans’
VHIs are regulated by the Ministry of Health which gen-
erally implements tight requirements that might be con-
sidered as more material regulations, the commercial
VHIs are regulated by the Ministry of Finance, which ap-
plies less intense requirements and tends to focus more
on financial regulation. Healthcare services covered by
all three segments may overlap and each VHI may in-
clude both complementary coverage (i.e. services ex-
clude from the statutory benefit package and/or
reimbursement of statutory charges) and supplementary
coverage (greater choice and higher accessibility to ser-
vices included in the statutory benefit package) [6,11,12].
Although the health plans’ VHIs are provided by non-
profit organizations and the group commercial VHIs are
provided by for-profit firms, both provide short-term
contracts that can be modified periodically (premium
levels and coverage) and both apply community rating
as a basis for their premiums. In addition, both segments
usually do not require medical underwriting. Although
the third segment, i.e. the individual commercial VHIs,
are provided by for-profit firms and share the same le-
gislative basis as the group commercial VHI, they are
significantly different from the group commercial VHIs
due to the fact that they assure lifetime contracts (in-
cluding guaranteed premiums and coverage) that are ad-
justed to personal risks (at enrollment) and enrollment
is conditional to a medical underwriting process.The health plans’ VHIs in Israel are provided by all four
health plans. Purchasing VHI from a health plan is condi-
tional to enrollment in the health plan. Clalit, Maccabi and
Meuhedet provide both lower and upper layers of coverage,
whereas Leumit provides two parallel plans. Purchasing the
upper layer of coverage in Clalit, Maccabi and Meuhedet is
conditional to purchasing the lower level. Compared to the
upper layer of coverage, the lower layer is quite similar (al-
though not identical) across all health plans. Generally,
both layers include relatively essential health services that
were not included in the statutory coverage due to budget
limitation. The lower layer of the coverage in Clalit is called
“Mushlam” and the upper one is called “Platinum”. The
lower and upper layers of coverage in Maccabi are called
“Silver Shield” and “Gold Shield”c respectively. The lower
layer of coverage in Meuhedet is called “Adif” and the
upper one is called “Meuhedet Si”. The parallel plans in
Leumit are called “Silver” and “Gold”. According to the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (Table 1), the level of concen-
tration in the health plans’ segment is relatively lower than
in the group commercial segment, where 6 firms operate
(0.35 vs. 0.40), although according to the CR3 index 95% of
income in both market segments is attributed to three or-
ganizations. A lower level of concentration is observed in
the individual commercial segment where 10 firms operate
(0.21 vs. 0.35) and 69% of this market segment’s income is
attributed to the three largest firms. The vertical structure
varies in the VHI market, both between and within seg-
ments. While all health plans employ their own physicians,
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the commercial firms (both group and individual) rely pri-
marily on contractual rather than ownership linkage with
providers.
Insurers in all segments of the VHI market are obligated
to report, to the regulator, data on several financial indica-
tors as well information about the health services covered
[11,12]. However, based on current laws and regulatory cir-
culars, neither tight regulation of MLR, such as a minimum
threshold or an MLR band, nor imposed sanctions, are ob-
served in this market. In addition, the coordination between
the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Finance regard-
ing the regulations in the VHI market using the MLR is
limited; there is no joint standardization of accounting, ad-
ministration and clinical practices and definitions.
Results
The number of people enrolled in VHI of health plans
in Israel is steadily growing, yet change rates have de-
creased since 2009 (Table 2). In 2012 74% of the Israeli
permanent residents owned at least one policy of VHI
provided by the nonprofit health plans. The rates of self-
reported ownership of commercial VHI are presented in
Table 3. In 2012 43% of the Israeli population reported
that they owned commercial VHI. These rates are high
compared to OECD countries [13].
The MLR in the VHI provided by nonprofit health plans
is calculated as a quotient of actual claims (deducted by
copayments) with respect to premiums revenues. The
total MLR in all health plans’ VHI was 82% in 2012 [11],
yet there is a variance in MLRs across health plans
(Table 4). Clalit and Meuhedet, where both layers of
coverage actively recruit beneficiaries, demonstrated
higher MLR in their lower layer of coverage as compared
to the upper layer (87% vs. 72% in Clalit and 96% vs. 45%
in Meuhedet). Most of the enrollees in Maccabi and Leu-
mit in 2012 owned the Gold layer of coverage, yet while
the MLR demonstrated in Maccabi was 87% in 2012, this
measure in Leumit was 69%. In addition, while this meas-
ure was relatively steady since 2005 in Clalit and Maccabi,
it decreased in Meuhedet and Leumit.
Unlike the calculation method adopted by the health
plans, the MLR in the commercial VHI is calculated as a
quotient of actual gross claims plus changes in outstand-
ing claims plus indirect expenses for claims management
(all included in the numerator) with respect to premiumTable 2 The number of people enrolled in health plans’ VHI*,
Year 2005 2006 2007
n (% of permanent residents) 4.848 (69%) 5.001 (70%) 5.185 (72%)
Change rate 3.2% 3.7%
*Including medical expenses (excluding: long-term care, compensation for critical ill
traveling abroad) in both lower and upper layers of coverage in Clalit, Maccabi and
#Source: [11,14,25-29].revenues (the denominator). In spite of this difference,
these two calculation methods are comparable to some
extent since, according to the Ministry of Finance, the
components of the changes in outstanding claims and
the claims’ management expenses in the numerator are
relatively marginal. The MLRs of group and individual
commercial VHI in 2012 were 85% and 38%, respect-
ively, and both had increased since 2005 (Table 5).
The description of the operation, marketing, general
and administrative expenses as percentage of premiums’
income is depicted in Table 6 (this data was not available
for the commercial VHI). The proportions of these ex-
penses in Meuhedet and Leumit are relatively higher
than those in Maccabi and Clalit. In addition, according
to the National Health Insurance Law, all VHI provided
by health plans must maintain a balanced profit and loss
statement. The net profit (or loss) of all health plans is
depicted in Table 7. Clalit’s VHI plan demonstrated con-
sistent profits since 2007. Maccabi has demonstrated
profits in 2005–2008, had deficits in 2009–2011 and
returned to present profit in 2012. Meuhedet has dem-
onstrated consistent profits since 2006 except in 2012
and Leumit has demonstrated consistent profits since
2005 (this data was not available, even in an aggregate
level, for the commercial VHI plans).Discussion
Our descriptive analysis reveals high rates of possession
of VHI in Israel. In addition, although MLR is not calcu-
lated in a uniform method, its values across market seg-
ments are comparable to some extent and values lower
than 70% (and even lower than 50%) are consistently ob-
served both in policies provided by nonprofit health
plans and individual policies provided by commercial
for-profit health insurance companies. Finally, the inten-
sity of regulation of MLR is relatively low as reflected by
the absence of MLR thresholds and imposed sanctions.
The following discussion refers to these insights in light
of extant literature.Adjusting the regulation intensity to the VHI characteristics
The regulatory approach that is applied in VHI market
segments should be associated with the segment role.
Namely, if publicly financed statutory universal health
insurance with generous coverage exists, it is assumedIsrael, 2005-2012#
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
5.389 (73%) 5.475 (73%) 5.578 (73%) 5.689 (73%) 5.808 (74%)
3.9% 1.6% 1.9% 2.0% 2.1%
nesses, disabilities and insurance of non-residents of Israel and for Israelis
Meuhedet, and both plans in Leumit (in millions).
Table 3 The rate of self-reported ownership of commercial
VHI, Israel, 2005-2012*
Year 2005 2007 2009 2012
% of population 34% 32% 35% 43%
*Source: Myers-JDC-Brookdale Institute’s survey among adult population
(≥22 years old). For this survey VHI included: medical expenses, dental care
and compensation for critical illnesses. Presented at The 13th Dead Sea
Conference on National Health Policy, December 2012.
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nancial regulation that mainly assures solvency may be
sufficient to protect the beneficiaries. If on the other
hand, no universal coverage exists and most of the
health care services are covered via VHI, material regula-
tion should be adopted in addition to the financial one.
Examples for this rationale can be found in the US and
Europe. The US health care system, which was mostly
based on privately financed VHI, enforced material regu-
lation through the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act by determining, for example, that health insur-
ance plans that do not meet a targeted MLR threshold
must provide rebates to their policyholders [7]. As op-
posed to this kind of material regulatory approach, no
threshold is imposed in European countries, where the
VHI market provides complementary and/or supple-
mentary coverage to the universal one and allows more
material regulative interventions targeted at statutory or
substitutive to statutory schemes [6]. The Israeli VHI
market resembles the European one, though it covers
several essential services that are not covered by the
statutory benefits package as in Europe such as dental
care for children (older than 12 years old) and the eld-
erly or physiotherapy and child development servicesTable 4 Medical loss ratios* of VHI, by health plan, 2005-2012
Health plan (% of the Israeli
permanent residents in 2012)
VHI (% of the Israeli
permanent residents in 2012)#
20
Clalit (52.3%) Mushlam (36.4%)
Platinum (13.4%)§
Total 82
Maccabi (25.0%) Silver Shield (0.5%)
Gold Shield (21.1%)§
Total 89
Meuhedet (13.6%) Adif (9.3%)
Si (5.4%)§
Total 88
Leumit (9.1%) Silver (0.5%)
Gold (5.7%)
Total 79
*The MLR is calculated as quotient of actual claims (deducted by copayments) with
#Percentages do not add up to 100% since people may be enrolled in both layers o
§Clalit Platinum was launched in 2007; In May 2012 Maccabi’s Silver Shield coverage
Meuhedet Si and Leumit Gold were launched in 2004.
**Source: [11,14,25-29].that are limited in the statutory coverage. VHI that pro-
vides these services might be considered as substitutive
to the statutory coverage. Due to the importance of im-
proving accessibility to essential services and given the
high penetration rate of VHI in Israel, one would expect
that tighter regulatory requirements would be applied.
The relatively higher MLRs that were continuously ob-
served in the upper layer of several nonprofit health
plans and the group commercial VHI (e.g. 85-90%) may
imply that setting high MLR threshold may be feasible
in this context. The consistent low levels of MLR ob-
served in several VHIs (45-70%) suggest that this kind of
tighter regulatory approach is applied in a limited man-
ner and that regulation is not necessarily adjusted to
whether the coverage includes essential services.
Tighter regulation does not necessarily mean a uni-
form one. It may be warranted to better define the role
of each VHI within segments, rather than applying uni-
form regulatory tools to the whole segment. For ex-
ample, currently both the lower and the upper layers of
coverage that are provided by the nonprofit health plans
include essential services. Regulators may monitor the
services included in the lower layer and assure that these
are mainly essential services that were not included in
the statutory coverage due to limited public resources. If
this is imposed, then tighter regulatory interventions
such as enforcement of MLR threshold could be justified
regarding the lower layer, whereas the upper layer may
be regulated less tightly (implementing different or no
thresholds). In addition, MLR thresholds may be differ-
entiated by the health plan’s size. The next subchapter of
the discussion will analyze the primary reasons for lower**
05 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
81% 85% 85% 89% 87%
37% 41% 51% 59% 72%
% 82% 76% 75% 77% 76% 80% 83%
88% 93% 89% 91% 90%
88% 95% 92% 95% 87%
% 89% 88% 88% 94% 90% 93% 87%
81% 81% 80% 89% 96%
33% 53% 57% 44% 45%
% 79% 75% 69% 73% 73% 74% 79%
57% 53% 57% 70% 69%
65% 67% 67% 69% 69%
% 75% 71% 64% 67% 67% 69% 69%
respect to premiums revenues.
f health plans’ VHI.
was closed for new enrollment and united with Maccabi Gold Shield;
Table 7 Net profit of VHI by health plan (in millions NIS),
2005-2012*
Health plan 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Clalit −16 −15 17 30 62 128 97 68
Maccabi 16 18 2 16 −39 −21 −60 6
Meuhedet −14 4 11 16 11 9 17 0
Leumit 5 16 23 16 9 11 8 9
*Source: [11,14,25-29].
Table 5 Medical loss ratios* of the commercial VHI,
2005-2012#
VHI 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Individual 30% 31% 33% 36% 36% 35% 38% 38%
Group 77% 73% 69% 69% 71% 71% 84% 85%
*The MLR is calculated as quotient of actual gross claims plus changes in
outstanding claims plus indirect expenses for claims’ management (all included in
the numerator) with respect to premiums revenues (the denominator).
#Source: [12,16-18,30-33].
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that is justified by continuous broadening of coverage;
diseconomies of scale; guaranteed lifetime contracts and
market concentration. In addition, it suggests corre-
sponding material regulatory tools.
Potential sources of low MLRs and suggested
intervention tools
Our descriptive analysis reveals that MLRs lower than
80% are observed both in VHI provided by nonprofit
health plans and VHI provided by for-profit commercial
firms. MLRs observed in the nonprofit health plans con-
sistently varied during the study follow-up period both
between and within health plans (between coverage
layers). The lower rate (72% in 2012) in the upper layer
of coverage in Clalit (Platinum) may be attributed to its
relatively recent launch date (2007) and to the fact that
the annual enrollment rate is still high, thus relatively
high proportion of its enrollees did not complete their
waiting period and cannot submit medical claims. This
explanation is not applicable to the Leumit (69% in
2012) and Meuhedet (45% in 2012) plans since their
launch date was 2004, and their enrollment rates are
relatively low. Thus, most of the beneficiaries already
completed their waiting periods and are free to submit
medical claims [14]. In addition to the influence of the
eligibility to submit medical claims that affects the nu-
merator, these low rates may be attributed to an increase
in premiums that influences the denominator. Adopting
more material regulation could evaluate the services in-
cluded in both layers of coverage, and if an increase in
premiums is justified by the inclusion of additional ser-
vices to the coverage, this inclusion may be monitored
and limited. It is not inevitable that premiums willTable 6 VHIs’ expenses distribution by health plan, 2012*
Health plan Clalit Maccabi Meuhedet Leumit
Health care expenditures
(co-payments deducted)
83% 87% 79% 69%
Operation, marketing, general
and administrative expenses
14% 13% 21% 27%
Surplus/deficit and financing
net expenses
4% 0% 0% 3%
*Source: [11].continuously increase due to additional coverage. If this
additional coverage is implemented too frequently and is
relatively non-essential, regulators may consider limiting it.
Another reason for the lower MLRs in Leumit and
Meuhedet (nonprofit health plans) and the individual
commercial VHI is diseconomies of scale which increase
marketing, commission and administrative costs for both
segments [5,15]. This argument may be reinforced by
the evidence of relatively low operational expenses (and
higher MLRs) in Maccabi and Clalit as compared to
Leumit and Meuhedet, yet material regulation that will
enforce disclosure/reporting requirements to promote
transparency will enable unbundling the non-medical
expenses (administration, marketing, agents’ commis-
sions etc.) and assuring that health plan efficiently allo-
cates its resources toward healthcare utilization of its
beneficiaries. In the nonprofit health plans segment, it
may be expected that the consistent profits (as observed
in Leumit and Meuhedet) may enable an increase in
their MLR through broadening coverage or shortening
the eligibility waiting period while assuring solvency. As
mentioned, data on the distribution of expenses among
insurers in the commercial segment (both group and in-
dividual) was not available in recent years. However, data
for 2005–2008 reveals that on average 12% of premium
revenues were distributed for general and administrative
expenses, while agents’ commissions comprised an add-
itional 20% of revenues [16-18]. Empirical analysis from
the US revealed an inverse relationship between em-
ployer group size and its loading fees [19]. Evidence
from 2011, the first year under the Affordable Care Act,
revealed that US insurers reduced administrative costs
nationally, but in the group (collective) markets no re-
duction in the nonmedical overhead was observed
(lower administrative costs were offset by increased
profits of a similar amount) [20].
The lower MLRs observed in the individual commer-
cial VHI may predominantly stem from the fact that the
individual commercial VHI in Israel are based on guar-
anteed lifetime contracts, thus are subject to high uncer-
tainty with regard to technological, morbidity and
regulation changes. This necessitates caution and reli-
ance on conservative assumptions in the pricing process.
As opposed to that, both the health plans and group
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terms (i.e. premiums levels and coverage) as needed. Evi-
dence for this argument was found in the private health
insurance market in Europe, where Hungarian health in-
surance plans that guarantee a lifetime contract demon-
strated significantly lower MLR compared to Ireland’s
ceteris paribus (54% vs. 71% in 2006 [6]). But these low
levels of MLR in the individual insurance policies are
not inevitable. It should be demonstrated that these life-
time contracts are actually being kept by most of the bene-
ficiaries until the contract ends. If this is not the case and
the beneficiaries terminate the contract earlier due to in-
ability to pay (premiums as well as copayments), regula-
tors may request insurers to adjust the actuarial model to
the actual behavior of most beneficiaries and this may re-
sult in reduction in premiums.
Another reason for relatively lower values of MLR in
the individual commercial market relies on the lower
bargaining power of the contract owner compared to
this power in group commercial VHI (i.e. the employer)
in lowering premiums and broadening coverage. How-
ever, as described before, the individual commercial VHI
segment is less concentrated than the health plans and
the group commercial segments as measured by the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index and the CR3 index. Our
findings also contradict recent empirical evidence from
the US [21,22] of lower MLRs among insurers with
monopoly power. This inconsistency may stem from the
fact that the analysis in the US was focused on insurers
within the individual commercial segment and that more
prominent attributes may have influenced health insur-
ance behavior. In addition, although the individual com-
mercial VHI is relatively more competitive than the
other two segments, all three segment are operating
under imperfect competition with three firms compris-
ing, in terms of income, 69% of the individual commer-
cial market and 95% of the nonprofit health plans and
group commercial segment. In the nonprofit health
plans segment this problem is aggravated due to the fact
that beneficiaries are relatively captive customers, since
they are required to be enrolled in the health plan for
the statutory coverage in order to purchase its VHI and
cannot opt for a VHI of another health plan without
changing the entire provision of the statutory health care
coverage including primary care physician, pediatrician
etc. These conditions necessitate relatively tight material
regulation which is targeted at consumer protection.
Although MLR may be used as a regulatory tool to pro-
tect consumers, it is well known that it ignores several
aspects. These include health gains and the beneficiaries’
experience [5,23]. Both components of MLR – premiums
and expenditures – do not exclusively reflect these out-
comes [5]. Thus, it is recommended to consider develop-
ing an unbiased measure for health gain and for thebeneficiaries’ experience both when purchasing health in-
surance and when submitting claims as part of regulatory
intervention. Indeed, in July 2014 the Ministry of Finance
in Israel published a service quality index of the commer-
cial VHI plans which focused on the claims handling
process. This index refers to the proportions of accepted
claims and to the promptness in which they were man-
aged. The World Health Organization (WHO) has defined
health systems’ “responsiveness” as comprised of aspects
such as: choice, communication, confidentiality, quality of
amenities and prompt attention [3,24]. Surveys of these
measures may need to be routinely and consistently im-
plemented and reported. Following the estimation of these
aspects, there is a need to develop a comprehensive ad-
equate summary measure of VHI’s value. It may be applied
by an estimation of the relative weights of different out-
comes from the beneficiaries’ point of view.Conclusion
The current study analyzed MLR as an indicator that
may be adopted by regulators in order to improve the
protection of beneficiaries and may reflect the intensity
of regulation in the VHI market. VHI in Israel covers
several essential services that are not covered by the
statutory benefits package due to budget constraints. It
is demonstrated that although regulators in Israel are
not subject to obligatory restrictions, a less tight regula-
tive approach was adopted in spite of the fact that con-
sistent low levels of MLR are observed. This was found
to be the case even in policies that provide several essen-
tial services which are not included in the statutory
coverage due to public budget constraints. Given the
high penetration rate of VHI in Israel, there might be a
need to consider adopting tighter material regulation in
this market in order to improve the protection of benefi-
ciaries. This regulation may include standardization and
transparency of MLR data, adjustments to the nature of
the services covered (i.e. through distinction between es-
sential and less essential coverage), imposing MLR
thresholds, limitation of services covered and adjusting
the actuarial models to the beneficiaries’ behavior. The
ability to apply these regulations depends on the exist-
ence of transparent and reliable databases and rigorous
standardization requirements regarding accounting, ad-
ministration and clinical practices and definitions.Endnotes
aThese health plans function as insurers as well as pro-
viders. In other countries they may be referred to as
HMOs (health maintenance organizations), MCOs (man-
aged care organizations) “sick funds” [1] or mutualities [6].
bDental care is excluded from the analysis of policies
provided by commercial insurance companies.
Simon-Tuval et al. Israel Journal of Health Policy Research  (2015) 4:21 Page 8 of 8cIn May 2012 Maccabi’s “Silver Shield” coverage was
closed for new enrollment and united with Maccabi
“Gold Shield”. In February 2013 Maccabi launched an
upper coverage, “Maccabi Sheli”. Thus, the lower layer
of coverage to date is “Gold Shield” and the upper one is
“Maccabi Sheli”.
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